Top 12 Defense‑Critical Applications Most Exposed to Gallium and Rare Earths

Defense programs now live or die on access to a handful of obscure materials. Gallium and rare earth elements (REEs) sit at the center of this problem. China currently dominates roughly 98% of global REE processing and close to 89-98% of primary gallium production, while the United States relies on imports for essentially all of its separated rare earth oxides and high-purity gallium. When Beijing imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in 2023, prices jumped and lead times lengthened fast enough to register inside radar and missile programs within months.

This briefing ranks the top 12 defense‑critical applications most exposed to gallium and rare earths, based on three lenses: kilograms of material per platform, concentration of supply in foreign entities of concern, and ease (or not) of substituting alternative technologies. The emphasis is on real operational exposure: radar arrays that can’t be fully populated, sonar systems waiting on permanent magnets, or guidance kits stranded in inventory because a single high‑purity oxide didn’t clear export licensing.

We draw on USGS data, recent U.S. Department of Defense critical minerals strategies, disclosed platform material inventories, and on‑the‑ground updates from projects such as Rio Tinto’s gallium recovery initiative in Quebec, US Critical Materials’ Sheep Creek rare earth project in Montana, and recycling plays from Geomega, Vulcan Elements, and ReElement. Each entry lays out the role of gallium and REEs, the specific bottleneck, and the realistic resilience pathways between now and the late 2020s.

What emerges is a risk map that looks very different from traditional “high‑value platform” lists. Radars and naval systems dominate the top tier, while some legacy airframes and soldier systems rank higher than many expect once tonnage and replacement difficulty are properly accounted for.

1. F‑35 Lightning II AESA Radar and Mission Systems

The F‑35 is the single most exposed U.S. platform to gallium and rare earth disruptions when tonnage, complexity, and strategic dependence are combined. Each aircraft is estimated to embed roughly 418 kg of rare earths across its radar, electric motors, actuators, and sensors, with 50-100 kg tied directly to the AN/APG‑81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) and associated mission systems. Gallium nitride (GaN) and gallium arsenide (GaAs) devices in the transmit/receive (T/R) modules underpin the jet’s long‑range, multi‑mode radar performance.

Strategically, the F‑35 fleet is the backbone of allied airpower from Europe to the Indo‑Pacific. GaN allows much higher power density and efficiency than previous gallium arsenide or silicon technologies, enabling simultaneous air‑to‑air, air‑to‑ground and electronic attack functions. On the rare earth side, neodymium‑iron‑boron (NdFeB) magnets with dysprosium and terbium additives sit in electric actuators, pumps, and generators, where high‑temperature stability is non‑negotiable for stealth operations.

The bottleneck is twofold: high‑purity gallium for GaN wafers and heavy rare earths (dysprosium, terbium) for high‑coercivity magnets. The U.S. has no primary gallium mining and very limited refining capacity; nearly all high‑purity gallium still originates in, or passes through, China. For heavies, China’s stranglehold on processing remains above 90%. DoD program offices have already reported radar module shortages in the 20% range during the first year of gallium export controls, forcing re‑sequencing of upgrade lots and stressing repair pipelines.

Mitigation is underway but back‑loaded. Rio Tinto’s Quebec tailings‑based gallium recovery and domestic REE projects such as Sheep Creek could cover a slice of demand after 2026-2027, and recycling firms are experimenting with magnet and T/R module recovery from scrapped systems. For now, the verdict is simple: the F‑35 remains the highest‑exposure platform in the inventory, and any extended gallium or heavy REE disruption would propagate almost immediately into sortie generation and coalition readiness.

2. Arleigh Burke DDG‑51 Aegis SPY‑6 Radar and Combat System

If the F‑35 is the most visible gallium‑dependent asset, the SPY‑6 radar family on Arleigh Burke destroyers is the quiet tonnage heavyweight. A single Flight III DDG carries on the order of 2,600 kg of rare earth content tied to radar, power systems, and electric drives, with large surface‑mounted GaN T/R modules providing the backbone of 360‑degree air and missile defense. Peak power demands, particularly for ballistic missile and hypersonic tracking, push gallium device requirements into ranges where substitution is technically and operationally painful.

Naval radars and combat systems stack REE exposures differently from aircraft. Beyond NdFeB magnets, systems such as SPY‑6 draw heavily on yttrium, gadolinium, and erbium for laser components, signal conditioning, and specialized alloys. The U.S. imported roughly 93% of its yttrium compounds from China in recent years, and the processing chain for gadolinium and erbium is similarly concentrated. Each destroyer is, in effect, a multi‑tonne bet on continued access to Chinese‑processed REEs and gallium.

Programmatically, any radar production or upgrade delay ripples across ship delivery schedules, Aegis baseline rollouts, and regional missile defense postures. The combination of high unit value, long lead times, and limited alternative platforms means even modest material disruptions matter. On the supply‑side, proposed gallium recovery from alumina and zinc tailings in North America could cover a single‑digit percentage of global needs mid‑decade, while REE recycling initiatives (such as Geomega’s planned Montreal facility) may offer cost‑effective magnet feedstock but won’t immediately solve heavy rare earths for SPY‑6.

Verdict: Arleigh Burke destroyers, and by extension Aegis‑equipped allies, form the naval epicenter of gallium and REE risk. Stockpiles for radar‑grade gallium and heavy REEs, longer‑horizon offtake agreements, and multiyear contracts with emerging recyclers are already becoming non‑negotiable for maintaining build and modernization schedules into the 2030s.

3. Virginia‑Class Submarine Sonar and Combat Systems

Submarine sonar suites quietly outrank most air and land systems once total rare earth tonnage is counted. A Virginia‑class attack submarine can embed around 4,600 kg of rare earth content across its main sonar array, towed arrays, quiet drive systems, and auxiliary motors. Low‑noise, high‑torque permanent magnet motors draw heavily on neodymium and dysprosium, while sonar arrays depend on specialized REE alloys (including scandium, ytterbium, and yttrium) and gallium‑based low‑noise amplifiers for long‑range, high‑fidelity detection.

Strategically, these submarines are central to undersea dominance, covert strike options, and intelligence collection in contested waters. Sonar performance is not a “nice to have”; it underpins survivability against increasingly capable adversary ASW networks. The combination of acoustic stealth and sophisticated processing electronics means gallium and REEs touch almost every key system that differentiates a modern SSN from an older fast‑attack boat.

Bottlenecks center on three materials: high‑purity gallium for RF and mixed‑signal electronics, dysprosium for high‑coercivity magnets in propulsion components, and scandium for select high‑performance alloys (for which the U.S. currently has essentially no primary production or refining). These are not materials that can be swapped out without deep redesigns and performance penalties. Program offices have already seen Block V schedules come under pressure from materials constraints more generally; if gallium or heavy rare earth availability tightens further, submarine builds are among the least flexible programs to re‑schedule.

Verdict: Virginia‑class submarines sit in the top‑three exposure tier because they combine multi‑tonne REE dependence with ultra‑long program timelines and minimal substitution room. Any credible resilience plan must tie undersea programs directly into long‑term contracts with emerging domestic REE processors and recyclers, rather than treating them as generic “priority customers” in a tight market.

4. Tomahawk and Long‑Range Cruise Missile Guidance Systems

Long‑range cruise missiles like the Tomahawk Block V translate mineral supply issues directly into munitions stockpile math. Each missile only embeds tens of kilograms of rare earths and grams‑level gallium, but the exposure scales with volume: inventories run in the thousands, and surge scenarios demand rapid replacement. REE content concentrates in samarium‑cobalt and NdFeB magnets for actuators and control surfaces, as well as in navigation and seeker components. Gallium‑based RF chips support terrain‑following radar, data links, and precision guidance under jamming.

In strategic terms, Tomahawks and similar systems provide stand‑off strike options that don’t require penetrating contested airspace with manned platforms. They’re also the bridge capability while hypersonic programs mature. Recent conflicts have shown how quickly precision munitions inventories can be drawn down; REE and gallium supply now constrains how fast those stocks can be rebuilt even if the industrial base has assembly capacity.

The bottleneck is high‑purity heavy REEs (dysprosium, terbium) for magnets that must survive extreme temperature swings and vibration without demagnetizing, and RF‑grade gallium for microwave components. Regulatory and export frictions compound the problem: even small volumes of specialty oxides and wafers face long lead times when export licenses tighten. Domestic magnet manufacturing is still nascent, and while several U.S. projects aim to produce military‑grade NdFeB within a few years, samarium‑cobalt and heavy REE supply chains remain significantly exposed to Chinese processing.

Verdict: Cruise missiles rank high on exposure because they combine critical operational roles, high consumption rates, and concentrated material bottlenecks in guidance and control sections. Program managers who assume “small system equals low risk” are already finding that a handful of grams of constrained materials can hold up entire production lots.

5. JDAM and Other Precision Guidance Kits

Guidance kits such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and laser‑guided bomb add‑ons turn large inventories of unguided munitions into precision weapons. From a materials perspective, their exposure profile looks very different from Tomahawk‑class missiles: each kit carries a smaller rare earth and gallium footprint (on the order of a few kilograms of REEs and sub‑kilogram gallium content), but annual unit volumes can reach into the hundreds of thousands in high‑tempo periods.

Strategically, JDAM‑type kits are the workhorses of modern air campaigns. Yttrium‑ and ytterbium‑doped fiber lasers, REE‑based phosphors, and gallium‑based semiconductors sit inside the seeker heads and guidance electronics, enabling terminal accuracy that keeps collateral damage and sortie counts down. When these materials tighten, the stress doesn’t necessarily appear as a total production halt; instead, it can manifest as lower yields, degraded performance bins, or reduced availability of the most capable variants (for example, all‑weather or moving‑target configurations).

The bottleneck here is primarily in yttrium and associated REEs for laser and sensor systems, paired with mid‑grade gallium components manufactured on mature process nodes. The U.S. is heavily reliant on Chinese‑origin yttrium, and although alternative sources exist on paper, qualifying new suppliers for high‑reliability guidance electronics is a multi‑year exercise. As Ukraine and other theaters have absorbed large numbers of precision kits, procurement officers have begun to confront the reality that materials supply, not only explosives and casings, sets the ceiling for sustainable output.

Verdict: Guidance kits rank mid‑pack on per‑unit exposure but high on aggregate risk because of their extraordinary consumption rates. They’re an early indicator sector: when JDAM‑class programs start flagging material issues, it’s usually a sign that higher‑value platforms will feel pressure next.

6. F‑35 Electro‑Optical Targeting and Sensor Fusion Suite

Staying with the F‑35 but shifting from radar to optics, the Electro‑Optical Targeting System (EOTS) and distributed aperture sensors are another major node of REE and gallium exposure. These systems integrate infrared search and track (IRST), laser designation, and high‑resolution imaging into the jet’s sensor fusion backbone. Gallium arsenide and related compounds underpin mid‑wave infrared detectors and focal plane arrays, while REE‑doped lasers and phosphors (involving elements such as terbium, europium, and yttrium) enable precise target designation and low‑signature emissions.

Strategically, these sensors are central to the F‑35’s value proposition in contested environments. They offer passive targeting options when radar emissions are risky, and they feed the common operating picture that other platforms increasingly rely on. Unlike some legacy pods that can be swapped or downgraded, the EOTS and associated apertures are tightly integrated into the airframe and mission software, making any redesign to avoid constrained materials extremely complex.

Bottlenecks mirror radar in some respects-high‑purity gallium compounds and heavy REEs-but optical systems add another layer of complexity: their performance is highly sensitive to materials quality, defect densities, and subtle process changes. That makes rapid supplier changes much harder. Program offices have already had to pace some sensor upgrade roadmaps to align with secure material sourcing, rather than pure engineering readiness. Meanwhile, potential domestic REE projects that could deliver terbium and dysprosium at scale are several years away from full qualification for such sensitive applications.

Verdict: The F‑35’s electro‑optical suite is less of a tonnage giant than its radar and power systems, but its reliance on ultra‑high‑spec gallium compounds and heavy REEs pushes it into the top half of this ranking. Any serious effort to harden the F‑35 supply chain needs to treat EOTS and apertures as co‑equal to AESA modules in material planning.

7. Predator/Reaper‑Class UAV Radars and ISR Payloads

Uncrewed systems like the MQ‑9 Reaper and its successors present a different risk profile: lower unit value than manned fighters, but rapidly expanding fleets and sensor payloads. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indicator (GMTI) systems such as the Lynx radar are built increasingly around GaN T/R modules and rely on high‑precision NdFeB magnets in gimbal drives and stabilization systems. A typical ISR‑configured UAV might carry 20–50 kg of REEs across radar, electro‑optical systems, and electric actuators, alongside modest but non‑trivial gallium content in RF front ends and datalink amplifiers.

From a strategic perspective, these aircraft underpin persistent ISR, pattern‑of‑life analysis, and long‑dwell strike options in theaters where deploying manned assets is politically or operationally constrained. As concepts of operation shift toward larger uncrewed fleets and, in some cases, swarming systems, the aggregate demand for gallium‑ and REE‑bearing sensors is poised to rise sharply, even if per‑airframe content doesn’t match a fifth‑generation fighter.

The bottleneck here is mostly on the radar and high‑throughput communication side: GaN production at defense‑grade quality is concentrated among a small number of foundries, which in turn depend on Chinese‑linked gallium supply chains. There’s also emerging pressure on actuator and gimbal magnets as total fleet counts climb. While UAV platforms might be more amenable to performance trade‑offs or tiered capability configurations, export‑controlled ISR payloads can’t simply pivot to commercial‑grade materials without compromising mission profiles.

Verdict: Predator/Reaper‑class platforms sit in the middle of the ranking but are the growth vector to watch. As more roles migrate to uncrewed systems, gallium and REE demand will follow, pushing these platforms from “secondary” to “core” consumers in supply negotiations.

8. Virginia‑Class and Other Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Motors

Submarine propulsion deserves a dedicated entry separate from sonar because the risk profile is subtly different. Modern quiet propulsion systems increasingly rely on large permanent magnet motors using neodymium‑iron‑boron with significant dysprosium content for high‑temperature stability. Individual motors can incorporate thousands of kilograms of rare earth magnets once stator and rotor assemblies, auxiliary drives, and pump systems are accounted for. Gallium also appears in high‑efficiency power electronics modules that modulate and control these motors.

Strategically, propulsion dictates acoustic signature, endurance, and overall survivability for nuclear submarines. Transitioning to high‑efficiency permanent magnet motors has delivered major gains in performance and noise reduction compared to legacy induction designs, but it has also locked these platforms into one of the most constrained corners of the rare earth market. Heavy REEs like dysprosium are critical to maintain magnet performance at elevated temperatures; without them, designers must either accept larger motors, lower performance, or more complex cooling systems.

The bottleneck is stark: China dominates the mining and processing of heavy rare earths used in high‑coercivity magnets. Alternative chemistries and motor architectures are under active development, but any wholesale shift for submarine propulsion would involve a major redesign and re‑qualification effort stretching over many years. Recycling firms targeting NdFeB magnet recovery from end‑of‑life industrial equipment and vehicles can help supplement supply, but the purity, coercivity, and traceability requirements for naval propulsion magnets are at the high end of the spectrum.

Verdict: Propulsion systems place Virginia‑class and other nuclear subs near the top of the REE risk table from a pure tonnage and substitution standpoint. Even if sonar and combat systems are prioritized for the first wave of resilient material sourcing, propulsion magnets will need dedicated strategies and long‑term contracts if future submarine availability is to be protected.

9. High‑Energy Laser (HEL) and Directed‑Energy Weapon Systems

Directed‑energy systems might still be emerging in terms of deployed numbers, but their materials footprint is already significant. Army, Navy, and Air Force high‑energy laser demonstrators in the 50–300 kW range typically rely on ytterbium‑ and neodymium‑doped fiber or slab lasers, drawing heavily on REEs such as ytterbium, neodymium, and yttrium, along with gallium‑based pump diodes and control electronics. A single high‑power HEL system can embed over 100 kg of REEs once power conditioning, beam control, and cooling subsystems are included.

Strategically, these systems are attractive precisely because they promise low cost‑per‑shot against drones, rockets, and, eventually, cruise missiles. That “unlimited ammo” narrative often glosses over the fact that the upfront material inputs are both specialized and geopolitically exposed. As programs like DE M‑SHORAD and ship‑mounted lasers move from prototypes to larger low‑rate production, demand for specific REE grades and gallium‑based diodes will grow quickly from a low baseline.

The bottleneck landscape here mixes old and new problems. On the REE side, ytterbium and yttrium supply is tightly linked to the broader Chinese‑centric rare earth processing system; they’re typically by‑products of larger light‑REE operations, making targeted ramp‑ups difficult. On the gallium side, HEL systems often need diodes with very high reliability and narrow wavelength characteristics, limiting the number of qualified suppliers. Because directed‑energy programs are still consolidating architectures, there’s an opportunity to design for material resilience, but that window will narrow rapidly once particular designs are locked in for serial production.

Verdict: High‑energy laser systems are not yet the largest absolute consumers of gallium and REEs, but they’re climbing the ranking as they transition from science projects to operational capabilities. Their exposure today is a leading indicator of how future point‑defense and counter‑drone architectures will amplify critical mineral demand.

10. Enhanced Night Vision and Soldier‑Borne Imaging Systems

At the other end of the scale from submarines and ships, soldier‑level systems like Enhanced Night Vision Goggles (ENVG‑B) and integrated visual augmentation devices embed small amounts of gallium and REEs per unit but at extremely high unit volumes. These devices often use gadolinium‑based scintillators, europium‑ and terbium‑doped phosphors, and gallium‑based semiconductor sensors (such as gallium arsenide or gallium phosphide) in image intensifier tubes and thermal imagers.

Strategically, these systems define night‑fighting capability and situational awareness for ground forces. As militaries move toward fused thermal/optical displays and augmented‑reality overlays, the sophistication-and material complexity—of soldier‑borne optics rises. While a single goggle might only contain grams of gallium and REEs, equipping hundreds of thousands of soldiers translates into multi‑tonne aggregate demand. Moreover, these devices sit at the intersection of military and commercial imaging supply chains, which already compete for sensor and phosphor capacity.

The bottleneck lies in specialty REE compounds for phosphors and scintillators, which rely on high‑purity europium, terbium, and gadolinium refined through Chinese‑dominated chains, paired with gallium‑based sensor wafers from a relatively small number of global fabs. Because soldier systems have somewhat more flexibility in form factor and performance than, say, fighter radar modules, there is room for partial substitution or tiered capabilities across units. However, experiments with alternative phosphor chemistries and non‑gallium sensor technologies are still early, and any significant degradation in performance would have clear tactical consequences.

Verdict: Night vision and soldier‑borne sensors rank lower on per‑unit exposure but high on political and operational sensitivity. Any noticeable degradation in availability or performance would be highly visible across the force, making them important candidates for early recycling pilots and diversified sourcing of phosphor and sensor materials.

11. Secure Military SATCOM and Jam‑Resistant RF Links

Secure beyond‑line‑of‑sight communications—whether through systems like MUOS, advanced tactical SATCOM terminals, or protected waveform radios—depend heavily on high‑performance RF front ends. Gallium nitride and gallium arsenide power amplifiers sit at the heart of these terminals, while REE‑based components such as garnet circulators, lutetium‑containing filters, and magnetically biased isolators ensure stable, jam‑resistant links under contested conditions.

Strategically, these links are the glue for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architectures. As adversaries invest in electronic warfare and anti‑satellite capabilities, the premium on high‑linearity, high‑power RF chains—and thus on gallium devices and specialized REE components—only increases. The shift toward proliferated low‑Earth orbit constellations doesn’t remove this dependency; it multiplies the number of terminals that need high‑spec RF hardware.

The bottlenecks mirror those in radar to some degree: high‑purity gallium supply and a narrow supplier base for defense‑grade GaN/GaAs MMICs. But SATCOM adds unique pressure on certain REEs, including lutetium and terbium in niche filter and isolator applications where performance windows are tight and alternatives limited. Many of these components are sourced through long, opaque supply chains that weave through commercial telecom vendors, making traceability and rapid qualification of alternative material sources challenging.

Verdict: Secure SATCOM doesn’t rival F‑35s or destroyers in raw tonnage, but the systemic impact of disruptions pushes it into the top‑tier exposure set. A handful of gallium wafer lots or REE‑based RF components can become the pacing factor for fielding jam‑resistant communications across entire theaters.

12. F‑16 and Other Legacy Fighter Engine and Control Actuation

Legacy platforms like the F‑16 are often treated as “lower risk” in modernization debates, but their sustainment stories say otherwise. Engine control systems, actuators, and auxiliary power units in these aircraft make extensive use of samarium‑cobalt and NdFeB magnets with dysprosium additives, along with gallium‑based sensors and control electronics in full authority digital engine control (FADEC) units. Per aircraft, REE content can reach into the tens of kilograms in aggregate once actuators, generators, and radar components are included.

Strategically, these fighters remain the backbone of many allied air forces and are heavily represented in export and security assistance programs. The surprise is not that they use critical materials; it’s that their long production history often masks how dependent ongoing sustainment has become on modern gallium/REE‑bearing subsystems introduced through upgrades. As new F‑16 variants and retrofit packages adopt AESA radars and more advanced mission computers, their exposure profile increasingly resembles newer platforms, even if airframes date back decades.

The bottleneck is twofold: ensuring continuity of supply for high‑temperature magnets used in engines and actuators, and maintaining access to gallium‑based electronics for upgraded radars and avionics. Unlike newer programs, legacy fleets often lack fully mapped, end‑to‑end visibility into their material supply chains, making it harder to prioritize which components to re‑design or dual‑source. Engine overhauls and radar retrofit schedules have already experienced delays that trace back, at least in part, to constrained availability of certain magnet and semiconductor components.

Verdict: F‑16s and other legacy fighters close out this top‑12 list not because their exposure is trivial, but because they offer slightly more flexibility in pacing upgrades and cannibalizing retired airframes. Even so, sustained pressure on gallium and heavy REE markets will increasingly force explicit tradeoffs between keeping legacy fleets modernized and feeding next‑generation platforms.

Strategic Supply‑Chain Takeaways

Viewed together, these twelve applications reveal a consistent pattern: a relatively small set of gallium and rare earth processing nodes underpins capabilities that span the entire kill chain, from early warning and ISR to precision strike and last‑mile soldier systems. Rough estimates suggest that U.S. defense programs alone are exposed to several billion dollars per year in cumulative spend tied directly to REEs and gallium, with the highest concentration in radar, sonar, propulsion, and secure communications.

History offers a useful comparison. During the Cold War, supply risk debates focused on chrome, cobalt, and platinum‑group metals for armor and jet engines. Those materials still matter, but the current cycle is different in two important ways: first, gallium and REEs sit deeper inside complex, high‑tech components that can’t be easily substituted or stockpiled in finished form; second, processing is far more geographically concentrated today than nickel or copper ever were. The result is a tighter coupling between geopolitical friction and day‑to‑day readiness metrics like radar availability, sortie rates, and submarine deployment cycles.

Mitigation pathways fall into three broad buckets. Near term, stockpiling high‑purity oxides, metals, and even key intermediates (such as magnet alloy powders and GaN wafers) can buffer 6–18 months of disruption, particularly for top‑tier applications like F‑35 radar modules and SPY‑6 arrays. Medium term, domestic projects targeting REE separation, magnet manufacturing, and gallium recovery from bauxite or zinc tailings can meaningfully reduce dependence if they’re tied to firm offtake commitments and realistic timelines. Longer term, recycling and design‑for‑recovery—through initiatives led by firms like Geomega, Vulcan Elements, and ReElement—offer the only scalable way to decouple defense capabilities from continuously rising primary extraction.

Two failure modes are worth keeping in view. The first is over‑reliance on optimistic project announcements without factoring in permitting, qualification, and cost curves; this can create a false sense of security in program planning. The second is treating each platform in isolation, rather than recognizing that F‑35s, destroyers, submarines, and soldier systems compete for overlapping material pools. As export controls and geopolitical competition evolve through the late 2020s, the programs that fare best will be those that move early to secure diversified, transparent supply for the specific gallium and REE chemistries that matter most to their readiness.